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Schlag in Wonderland
JOANNE CONAGHAN*

The drearinessof d~jt vu might be tolerable if one could muster
the sense that the countless normative prescriptions contained in
judicial opinions, statutes, regulations,and law review articles mattered. But by and large they don't.'
"If there's no meaning in it," said the King, "that2 saves a world
of trouble, you know, as we needn't try to find any."
INTRODUCTION

Pierre Schlag is taking the American legal academy by storm. He is
also taking it to task. In a deluge of books and articles over the last
decade, including, most recently, a lengthy article gracing the sacred
pages of the Harvard Law Review,3 Schlag has exhorted legal scholars

to "lay down the law"4 (and he does not mean legislate), to cease making normative prescriptions to policy-makers and judges, 5 and to
acknowledge that their reason has become enchanted, rendering them

both delusional and cognitively impaired; trapped within "an enchanted
legal world populated with magical entities

linked by magical

thinking." 6
Despite the softening effect of a wry humor and keen wit, Schlag's

admonishments to his peers are mercilessly candid and resolute. In particular, The Enchantment of Reason vividly depicts the world of American legal scholars as shallow and dissolute, replete with fear, dread,

avoidance, desperation, and deceit. They have committed the worst sin
imaginable: exchanging reason for faith in disguise. They have made it
their collective purpose to conceal the presence of an imposter in their
* Professor, Kent Law School, University of Kent. My warm thanks to Pam and Michael
Fischl for their hospitality and hard work in organizing this symposium; to Peter Goodrich, Paddy
Ireland, Steve Pethick, and Erika Rackley for their helpful comments on an earlier draft of this
paper; and to Pierre Schlag for his graciousness and sense of humor.
1. PIERRE SCHLAG, THE ENCHANTMENT OF REASON 141 (1998) [hereinafter ER].
2. LEWIS CARROLL, Alice's Adventure in Wonderland, in THE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL
107 (Roger Lancelyn Green ed., 1968) [hereinafter AW.
3. Pierre Schlag, The Aesthetics of American Law, 115 HARV. L. REV. 1049 (2002).
4. See generally PIERRE SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW: MYSTICISM, FETISHISM, AND THE
AMERICAN LEGAL MIND

(1996)

[hereinafter SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW].

5. See id. at 17-76; see also Pierre Schlag, Normative and Nowhere to Go, 43 STAN. L. REV.
167, 182-86 (1990); Pierre Schlag, Normativity and the Politics of Form, 139 U. PA. L. REV. 801,
801-04 (1991).
6. ER, supra note 1, at 17, 126-44.
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midst through disingenuous appeals to truth, goodness, and fate.
Bewitched and befuddled by the charms of a mere simulacrum of reason, legal scholars consequently miss much and see little; their minds
closed, their gaze averted, their insights warped and stunted within the
disciplinary frame 7 they have contrived for themselves. The Enchantment of Reason undoubtedly poses a serious challenge to the integrity
and purpose of American legal scholarship. Moreover, its tacticsinvolving in particular the subjection of the work of the academy's
"stars" (Dworkin, Nussbaum, and Sunstein are prime targets) to gruelling and at times humiliating dissection-are devastatingly effective.
The difficulty is that Schlag does the job almost too well. Indeed, one
cannot help but wonder-if he is right and the American legal academy
is the empty, inadequate, ineffective, fearful, and dishonest wonderland
of nonsense he describes-why he bothers. Surely there are more
important things to worry about than the flurries and foibles of legal
academia. Why dwell at such length upon what Schlag has so skillfully
revealed to be the misguided delusions of an insignificant and overinflated few? One answer may be that Schlag believes the American
legal academy is worth saving (albeit in need of a Messiah). Alternatively, he may consider his critique to have wider implications, casting
his gaze beyond the (legal) academy to address, albeit indirectly, broader
social, political, and cultural concerns. Neither position can be gleaned
unambiguously from the pages he has penned. One is compelled either
to read between the lines, probe the gaps, scan the interstices of Schlag's
work, or conclude that he devotes an enormous amount of attention to
activities that are, by his own account, largely without point.
NARRATIVE OF OMISSION

We are always within the situation, and to throw light on it is a
task that is never entirely completed.8
"You should say what you mean," the March Hare went on. "I
do" Alice hastily replied; "at least-I mean what I say-that's the
same thing, you know." "Not the same thing a bit!" said the Hatter.
"You might just as well say that 'I see what I eat' is the same thing as
'I eat what I see'!"9

A productive route to a better understanding of Schlag's purpose
and motivation-and thereby to a fuller and more informed critical
grasp of the intellectual worth and political potential of his work-may
7. Id. at 10, 21.
8. Id. at 69 (quoting H.G.

GADAMER, TRUTH AND METHOD

9. AW, supra note 2, at 68-69.

269 (1975)).
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be to attend to the silences in The Enchantment of Reason, to highlight
what is absent as well as what is present, to seek out implicit as well as
explicit agendas. There is, I would contend, as much to learn from
Schlag's omissions as from his acts. As lawyers, of course we are all too
familiar with the vagaries and inconsistencies that surround the act/
omission distinction. We are also alert to the ideological power the
dichotomy carries, particularly in the context of ascribing responsibility.
To act is to be held responsible. To fail to act-to omit-is, according to
conventional morality, to be without responsibility; an omission is never
as morally heinous as an act. Underpinning this conventional morality is
a series of assumptions about attribution of cause and consequence. An
act is said to set in motion-cause-a chain of events, a set of consequences; an omission, by contrast, has no causative effect and is therefore without consequences (we can of course all cite the standard
exceptions to this general assertion).
As criticallawyers, however, we recognize this to be absolute humbug. The act/omission dichotomy is a sham-in Derridean terms, it is a
"logocentric hierarchy," part of a "categorical regime" that constrains,
enables, and organizes the discursive practice of law.' 0 It is also a
dichotomy that is impossible to draw with any certainty, with efforts to
do so inherently value-laden. In particular, the attribution of cause and
consequence is almost always preceded by unarticulated, morally predetermined assumptions about responsibility. An omission can be just as
morally heinous as an act (besides which, it is an act depending on how
you choose to look at it), and it can certainly carry consequences, perhaps serious ones.
The Enchantment of Reason is a work replete with omissions. As it
unpicks what is unthought, it resounds with what is unsaid. And, in the
unsaid, it precisely echoes much of what it attacks. These omissions may
have consequences-possibly serious consequences-both for Schlag's
own project (however we understand it) and for that of critical legal
studies (understood in its broadest and most encompassing sense). " If
so, these consequences need to be examined. What is unsaid deserves as
much attention as what is unthought.' 2
10. Pierre Schlag, "Le Hors de Texte, C'est Moi": The Politics of Form and the
Domestication of Deconstruction, II CARDOZO L. REV. 1631, 1648 (1990) [hereinafter Schlag, Le
Hors].
11. Meaning that they are understood to embrace critical approaches to law that draw upon

but are not historically, geographically, or thematically confined to American critical legal studies
(CLS). Elsewhere, Schlag identifies himself as a "deconstructionist" whose relationship to CLS is
one of developing their themes "in more faithful directions." Pierre Schlag, U.S. CLS, 10 LAW &
CRITIQUE 199, 208 (1999).
12. On the "unthought" in reason and in American legal scholarship, see ER, supra note 1, at
69-77.
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What then does Schlag leave unsaid but that nevertheless speaks so
loudly? What omissions leap from the pages of The Enchantment of
Reason and, carrying their consequences, scuttle away in fear of detection? Well firstly, as a feminist, I cannot help but be struck by the total
lack of engagement with feminist and critical race scholarship. By virtue
of its omission, this body of work is situated outside Schlag's enquiry
into reason.' 3 This is surprising, not least because American legal scholarship-about which Schlag purports to have something to say-offers
more quarter than most to feminist and critical race scholarship. It is also
puzzling because feminists in particular have long been preoccupied
with reason; women having been pronounced bereft of it at least since
the time of Aristotle. ' 4 More recently, in the United States context, both
feminists and critical race scholars have found themselves under attack
because their scholarship is deemed to have "failed the test for rational
discourse."' 5 Reason is being deployed openly and aggressively to
silence and devalue legal scholarship that departs from the conventions
of the mainstream academy.' 6 Schlag's inattention to the concrete political context in which recent debate in law has played out in the American
legal academy is troubling, to say the least.
From this one is drawn not only to question the homogeneity of
Schlag's representation of American legal scholars but also to impute his
apparent depiction of legal discourse as autonomous and self-generating.
His default presentation of legal scholarship is one that brooks little or
no intrusion from the "outside" world of politics, society, economy, or
culture. Most of the boundaries within which legal discourse purports to
operate remain disconcertingly unbreached. As a consequence, there is
absent from The Enchantment of Reason any sustained engagement with
the broader social and political dimensions of the arguments Schlag
makes. There are occasional oblique hints that legal discourse in general
and the enchantment of reason in particular carry implications well
beyond the confines of the academic community Schlag is addressing
13. Because Schlag totally bypasses sex and gender issues, the perspectives of gay and
lesbian legal scholars are not featured either.
14. Aristotle did not restrict his category of "defectives" to women, observing that the slave is
entirely without the faculty of deliberation; the female indeed possesses it, but in a form which
remains inconclusive. ARISTOTLE, THE POLITICS OF ARISTOTLE 124 (B. Jowett trans., 1885). Thus,

his conception of rationality is also compatible with notions of racism.
15. Larry Alexander, What We Do and Why We Do It, 45 STAN. L. REV. 1885, 1892, 1895

(1993).
16. See especially SUSANNA SHERRY & DAN FARBER, BEYOND ALL REASON: THE RADICAL
ASSAULT ON TRUTH (1997), a vehement attack on "radical multiculturalism" (their term) in
American legal scholarship. The highly charged fall-out from Beyond All Reason reflects the
deeply political nature of Farber & Sherry's intervention. See generally Symposium, Essays in
Response to Beyond All Reason, 83 MINN. L. REV. (1999).
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and critiquing. But why take this on faith? Surely the significance of
Schlag's intellectual contribution stands or falls on the basis of whether
or not he is berating American legal scholars for their bad habits or
making arguments of weightier intellectual and political worth. Schlag's
coyness here leaves the radical scholar with a deep sense of dissatisfaction and unease. How, she might ask, does all this relate to institutions,
structures, practices, and discourses beyond the legal academy (or for
that matter, within it)? Moreover, does not an understanding of the current reign of reason in the academy require at least some attention to the
historical, social, and political conditions from which it sprung? Or can
we confidently consign such factors to the background of enquiry into
reason's seductive power and reductive effects? Most importantly, what
does the enchantment of reason do to people (beyond befuddling American legal academics)?
Thus, one arrives at yet another striking omission in Schlag's critique: it would seem that the material world and its corporeal inhabitants
are missing. This is an ideational investigation unencumbered by the
messiness and unpredictability of bodies or the dreary cataloguing of
material disadvantage and suffering. Schlag's concerns are of a different
kind, namely to chronicle the extent of self-delusion characterizing
American legal academics and question the integrity and rightness of the
positions they adopt. His is a study of intellectual moves, of the "rhetorical tricks"17 and "Noble Scams"1 8 passed off as legal reasoning, thus
leading one reviewer cynically to remark that "for [Schlag], American
law is a mind-game that is not played well enough."' 19
Now, it may fairly be protested that this is a scurrilous statement,
that Schlag's work constitutes a strong challenge to those who doggedly
persist in the mind games of the academy. It may also be argued that
Schlag does recognize the grave implications of legal mind games: law
is, he has acknowledged, a field of pain and death,2 0 and reason, he
maintains, plays a central role in legitimizing the "ritualized forms of
violence . . . incarceration, killing, plunder, extortion and so on"21 of
which legal practices comprise. But, as I read on, the suspicion still lingers. Surely reason fails not just in the pages of law reviews, but also in
the apologies for and rationalizations of material and social practices
17. ER, supra note 1, at 44 (commenting on the work of Cass Sunstein).
18. Id. at 34 (commenting on Dworkin).
19. Penny Pether, On Foreign Ground: Grand Narratives, Situated Specificities, and the
Praxis of Critical Theory and Law, 10 LAW & CRITIQUE 211, 224 (1999).
20. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 4, at 36 (drawing on the seminal article by
Robert Cover, Violence and the Word, 95 YALE L.J. 1601 (1986)); see also ER, supra note 1, at
21.
21. SCHLAG, LAYING DOWN THE LAW, supra note 4, at 36; see also ER, supra note 1, at 21.
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which yield inequality, deprivation, oppression, and hurt. Why does he
shrink from talking with any particularityabout these all too important
implications of the legal mind game? And where are the voices of the
unequal, deprived, oppressed, and hurt? Why are they not here? What
role does reason play in suppressing them? (As it turns out, quite a lot.)
And, if reason does suppress them, why does Schlag's critique not set
them free? In this article, I seek to answer some of these questions by
probing the extent to which the omissions I have identified unselfconsciously reflect the discursive frames Schlag is attacking. I want to track
the consequences of this reflection. My overriding concern is the extent
to which Schlag's preoccupation with the foibles of the mainstream legal
academy may unduly inhibit the intellectual and political potential of his
work. I believe such potential is there, and, far from counselling the
jettisoning of Schlag's work-as others, attentive to his omissions, have
done 22 -I urge progressive legal scholars to take it seriously but not to
take it on faith. In particular, I consider it both appropriate and constructive to call Schlag on what appears to be a glaring lack of engagement
with the implications of positionality and its relationship to power. This
seems to me to be the greatest omission in The Enchantment of Reason.
It does not betray sufficient consciousness of its own standpoint, let
alone that of those who are cast in its shadows.2 3 As a consequence, it
never fully escapes the frame, the grid, the web that reason weaves.
Schlag would probably acknowledge that. After all, it proves his
point that whatever is sought is always in some sense a construction of
the "search" instituted to find it. 24 Nevertheless, to continue Schlag's
metaphor, it remains the case that not everyone is involved in the
"search" to the same extent or, indeed, at all. Some hover on its margins,
others avoid it, work to subvert it, or are precluded from joining it. From
their diversely situated perspectives, the parameters of the search may be
all too apparent; its effectiveness and purpose open to serious question,
and the principle or set of principles that inform it (however exaggerated

22. Goodrich observes: "Brian Leiter dismissed Schlag for what he could not say, Neil
Duxbury criticized him for what he should have said, and David Carlson expounded at length
upon what he did not say .... Each of these responses counseled, either directly or indirectly, that
Schlag's work be jettisoned .... " Peter Goodrich, Pierre the Anomalist: An Epistemology of the
Legal Closet, 57 U. MIAMI L. REV. 791, 815 (2003).

23. Another reason for attending to the omissions in Schlag's work is that their elaboration
offers us clues to his standpoint. More broadly, a consciousness of standpoint highlights the
relativity of knowledge and the significance of silence as well as speech.
24. In The Enchantment of Reason, Schlag uses the conduct of a police search in Edgar Allan
Poe's, The Purloined Letter, allegorically to introduce the main themes of the book, particularly
the idea that the framing of an issue operates to constitute and redefine it. See ER, supra note 1, at
1-17.
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their application) contentious or misapplied. To put it another way, some
of us may be more enchanted than others.
THROUGH THE LOOKING GLASS

What is called reason these days is very often not.25
Alice explained, as well as she could, that she had lost her way.
I don't know what you mean by your way, said the Queen: all the
ways about here belong to me.26
It is perhaps an obvious question to ask but.., enchanted by what
precisely? In Schlag's case, the answer is far less apparent than one
might expect. It should be stressed at the outset that this is not-nor
does it purport to be-an abstract philosophical discourse on reason.2 7
Reason for Schlag's purposes is bound by the confines of the legal academy; it is what passes for reason among American legal scholars that
concerns him. Interestingly, at no point does he define what he means by
reason. This is probably a wise move. Given the variety of views-even
within law-on what counts as reason, attempts to define it are invariably tricky, eliciting pronouncements that are either hopelessly vague or
internally contradictory.2 8 Acts of definition also raise the risk of side
tracking debate with considerable amounts of intellectual effort
exhausted by interminable disputes of definition and scope. Anyway,
Schlag's pointed avoidance of any definitional exercise necessarily
flows from the arguments he is making. Once reason is defined, mapped,
plotted, and located, it becomes not reason exactly, but whatever it is
that is defined, mapped, plotted, and located. "Reason," for these purposes, becomes no more than a construction of the logic of the disciplinary frame within which the scholar/topographer is working. Schlag is
not going to fall into that trap.
Nevertheless, Schlag's refusal to delineate with any precision the
object of his critique is not a risk-free strategy. One difficulty arising is
that reason remains deliciously ephemeral throughout, assuming a
25. Id. at 144.
26. LEWIS CARROLL, Through the Looking Glass, in THE WORKS OF LEWIS CARROLL 133
(Roger Lancelyn Green ed., 1968) [hereinafter ALG].
27. Therefore to assess it in these terms, as some reviewers have done, is, frankly, to miss the
point. See C.J. Summers, Distorting Reason, 11 YALE J.L. & HUMAN. 529 (1999).

28. A prime example here is Susanna Sherry, The Sleep of Reason, 84 GEo. L.J. 453 (1996).
After elaborating her views on what reason is, largely in terms of what it is not, id. at 455,

observing in passing that reason may sometimes embrace "common human emotions," id. at 456,
she then proceeds roundly to condemn feminist and critical race scholarship because of its
allegedly "emotional" derivation. Id. at 476-77. This is, among other things, a classic instance of
the uncritical invocation of the reason/emotion dichotomy to discredit and silence non-traditional

points of view.
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dream-like, shadowy quality that at times heightens its allure and triggers a desire to capture and contain it. This is of course a reflection of
Schlag's own ambivalence towards reason, signalled in particular by his
use of the word "enchantment" 29 to denote our (his?) affinity to it.
Schlag's portrayal of reason is that of a siren, a femme fatale, who
simultaneously entices and deceives. And, while he urges us endlessly to
recognize her pathological tendencies, we remain suspicious that he is
still in her thrall. More importantly, however, the nebulous quality of
Schlag's invocations of reason is misleading and belies the prescriptive
content of the notion(s) he deploys. Reason, for Schlag's purposes, is
bounded in ways he does not openly acknowledge. Woven within the
fabric of his critique is a particular perspective from which reason's purposes are derived and its shortcomings identified and assessed.
And Moving Thro' a Mirror Clear .

.30

While careful to avoid definitions, even Schlag recognizes the need
to give some content to the object of our enchantment. For example, he
is free with his metaphors for reason and its progeny. Reason, he claims,
is associated with the "maze" of doctrine that forms the daily diet of
legal scholars 3 ; it provides a "frame" that delineates the parameters of
legal work. 32 Sometimes, it is a "game" which only lawyers know how
to play properly. 33 It is also a matrix,34 a pathway, 35 a web,3 6 and a
network.3 7 You get the picture. Thus envisaged, reason is a way of
ordering and presenting knowledge, particularly in a legal context where
it is closely associated with values of coherence, comprehensiveness,
and determinacy (what Schlag identifies as the "essential . . . [features

of] good legal thought" 38 ). Reason does the job of connecting diverse
material in a "grid of intelligibility" by the use of "inferences, deductions, analogies, extensions, modifications, limitations, [and] nega29. Defined in the concise Oxford English Dictionary to mean "delight, charm, or bewitch."
OXFORD ENGLISH DICTIONARY

385 (1991). Schlag's attraction to, longing for, loss of the object

of his critique is readily identified by other commentators. See, e.g., David Gray Carlson,
Duellism in Modern American Jurisprudence, 99 COLUM. L. REv. 1908 (1999); see also
Goodrich, supra note 22.
30. ALFRED LORD TENNYSON, The Lady of Shalott, in THE POEMS AND PLAYS OF ALFRED
LORD TENNYSON

31.
32.
33.
34.

53, 54 (1938).

ER, supra note 1, at 33.
Id. at 3, 6, 10.
Id. at 36.
Id. at 44.

35. Id. at 76.
36. Id. at 59.
37. Id. at 24.

38. Id. at 6, 15 ("Reason . . . is the formative medium through which the field of law is
organized and represented.").
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tions,' 39 and American legal scholarship is a wholesale "rationalization"
enterprise, entailing the endless summarizing, restating, reconstructing,
and systematizing of legal materials.4" Reason, Schlag claims, is law's
architectural plan. What Schlag captures brilliantly in The Enchantment
of Reason is this engineering dimension to reason, its building role in the
context of knowledge formation and selection. Reason provides the
structural framework for law (and for many other disciplines); it offers a
range of techniques through which law's form may be prescribed and its
content developed; it is the aesthetic lens through which law is viewed
and appreciated. At the same time, reason patrols the borders of law, it
determines what counts and what does not and, most importantly, it renders the world upon which law operates "amenable" by screening anything that cannot be fitted within the frame that it constructs.4 '
Such an understanding of reason's role in law is highly appealing.
It equips legal scholars with a series of intellectual maneuvers which, if
they master, they can deploy to impressive effect.42 It renders legal
material determinate, but still malleable. It also presents a pleasing
image of law as uniform, consistent, and predictable, in which the job of
the scholar becomes the maintenance of legal order, the preservation of
internal coherence, the pursuit of perfect harmony. Yet despite, indeed
because of, these attractions, reason so conceived is, as Schlag points
out, highly coercive. It extends well beyond the realms of mere presentation, operating actively to proscribe disorder, invalidate incoherence,
and silence dissonance. Reason is univocal. Adhering to a "monistic aesthetic," it imposes a "unitary conceptual matrix" on a pluralistic world 43 ;
it is thus inescapably hierarchical and, in substituting one for many competing visions of law, its operations, and effects, is closely implicated in
the exercise and abuse of power. Schlag's account of reason's repressive
tendencies is sharply focused on the legal conceptual regime that enables
the privileging of some viewpoints over others. Yet, without some attention to the material practices from which such privileging derives and in
which it concretely operates, his analysis can tell us little about who is
empowered and disempowered by reason's operations. The systematicity
of reason's exclusionary tendencies, its role in constituting and reinforcing particularhierarchies, is simply not brought into view. Instead, his
39. Id. at 24.
40. Likewise, American legal theory is a quintessentially rationalist project: "a highly abstract

and systematic rendition of law as a kind of prescriptive normative discourse." Id. at 26.
41. As

in any inconvenient "[g]aps,

paradoxes, aporia, discontinuities,

disjunctions,

undecidabilities, ambiguities, ambivalencies .... " Id. at 45.
42. Even radical legal scholars, recognizing that legal work comprises a fairly narrow range
of discernible "moves," are then empowered to use them to good political purpose. For further
discussion, see Jane B. Baron, Romancing the Real, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 573 (2003).
43. ER, supra note 1, at 44-45.
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focus shifts to the authenticity of reason; his concern becomes that of
exposing the fraud that lies at the heart of its deployment, namely its
claim to rule. Reason, Schlag argues, is a pretender.
For these purposes, Schlag seeks to probe the relationship between
reason and belief. He asks (with some exasperation): "How is it that
unexamined beliefs are parlayed into the work of reason itself?" 44 Moreover, on what grounds, if any, can reason distinguish itself from other
"sources of belief," for example, "authority, experience, convention, tradition, ethics, and so on?" 45 Schlag's attitude towards these other
sources of belief is not easily pinned down. Sometimes he is neutral
about their virtues: the assumption is that reason and these other disparate sources of belief perform more or less the same job-they ground or
purport to ground people's beliefs. At other times, it seems clear that
some sources of belief are more acceptable to Schlag than others. For
example, reason is frequently compared to its ostensible opposites
"faith, prejudice, dogma, and company," and a theme running throughout the book is the tendency of reason to slip into, indeed become one or
46
more of these undesirables-what Schlag describes as "the unthought"
or "pathological forms"4 7 of reason. The thrust of Schlag's argument is

that while reason sets itself above these and other sources of belief, it is,
ultimately, unable to sustain its own privileging and, as often as not, is
likely to emerge as those other sources of belief in disguise.
Schlag reserves his strongest disapproval, however, for sources of
belief that derive from magic or faith. An anti-faith sentiment is detectable at various points in The Enchantment of Reason,48 along with a tendency to mock the magical and the revelatory.4 9 Thus, Schlag derides
the fully "enchanted world [of American law for being] populated with
44. Id. at 38.
45. Id. at 22. He also includes perception, "dogma, bias, prejudice ...

revelation ...

custom

...force, power.., emotion, [and] faith ....in his catalogue of "sources of belief." Id. at 25-26,
40.
46. Id. at 69.
47. Id. at 75.

48. For example in his references to faith/the church to ridicule the work of legal scholars, id.
at 43; in his gleefully ironic deployment of "Pascal's Wager," id. at 53-58; in the constant
association of faith with other undesirables as in "faith, dogma, prejudice, and company," id. at
63; in the invocation of notions of divinity and deification to mock reason's self-aggrandizement
and reveal its deluded and deluding qualities, id. at 92; and, finally, in his comparison of lovelorn

legal scholars for whom law is a "jealous mistress" to "Catholic nuns who understand themselves
to be the brides of Jesus Christ." Id. at 105. I seek not to condemn Schlag's anti-faith sentiment,
merely to observe that he has one.
49. Magic plays a duel and somewhat contradictory role in Schlag's account of reason. It is,
on the one hand, a metaphor for reason's compelling grip on the American legal psyche. On the
other hand, it is also a caricature, communicating the sorry extent to which reason fails to perform
the tasks allotted to it. At times, this simultaneous portrayal of magic as both powerful and
preposterous is more confusing than it is elucidating.
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magical entities linked by magical thinking;"" ° he is scornful of the
"soothing magic words" 5 ' invoked by lawyers to avoid "the moment of
vertigo"5 2 that the loss of reason is likely to induce. And he attributes the
lamentable state of American legal scholarship to the excessive deployment of reason by those whose bewitchment leaves them insufficiently
attuned to reason's "predicaments" and their destabilizing and selfdestructive tendencies. Left unchecked, this produces the "deification"
of reason: reason is elevated to an object of faith and its operation in law
becomes utterly compromised by reliance on a version of itself that is
anything but reasoned. "Ironically, as reason becomes deified it becomes
denatured-less and less capable of checking its own operations. It collapses into what it claims to oppose: faith, dogma, prejudice, and
company." 54
Shadows of the World Appear...
One of the difficulties here is that one is never quite clear when
Schlag is inside and when he is outside the value systems that frame his
account of reason as a "source of belief." Is his claim that faith and
magic lack validity as sources of belief within the framework of validation instituted by reason, or is it that they are-self-evidently-inferior?
It does seem to be both but, if so, on what grounds can the latter assertion be sustained? Moreover, is Schlag's objection to reason as a source
of belief the fact that it more often than not becomes its "traditional
enemies: faith, dogma, prejudice, and company,"" or is it that it is not
what it purports to be? In other words, is it faith, prejudice, and so on
that Schlag objects to or is it simply the con?57 Either way, the question
is important because it sheds light on the values-dare I say normsSchlag is invoking and within which his critique operates. This is not the
view from nowhere (Schlag would hardly claim it is). So where exactly
is it coming from? What is its standpoint? Why the focus on faith? Is
Schlag motivated by a personal antipathy towards manifestations of faith
and religion? Or is it the perpetration of a fraud that offends him, the
invocation, in the name of reason, of its antagonists? Is he, perhaps,
50. ER, supra note 1, at 17.
5 1. For example, "reasonable balance, reasonableness, good judgment, careful craftmanship,
pragmatism .... " and so on. Id. at 22.
52. Id. at 21.

53. Id. at 60-91.
54.
55.
56.
57.

Id. at 92.
See TENNYSON, supra note 30, at 54.

ER, supra note 1, at 63.
See in particular Schlag's discussion of the "Noble Scam." Id. at 33-36.
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beneath the fashionable garb of postmodernism, an intellectual puritan, a
truth-seeker?
Leaving aside, for a moment, speculation about Schlag's personal
values/antipathies and their implication in the arguments he mounts in
The Enchantment of Reason, it must be recognized that his preoccupation with reason as a source of belief is both striking and pre-emptive. It
prescribes a particular test for the validity of knowledge. To be valid,
knowledge must ground belief. And, Schlag argues, reason can no more
ground belief than magic or faith. Sometimes (often in fact) it is simply
magic or faith. Suppose, however, that we consider the validity of
knowledge in different terms? Suppose we reject the notion that to be
valid knowledge must ground belief in favor of more open, flexible, pluralistic approaches to knowledge validation. Do magic and faith then
emerge as self-evidently without value?
Take, for example, fairy tales. These are narratives positively
steeped in the world of enchantment. Is there a sense in which fairy tales
are "valid" knowledge? Do they perhaps offer useful, sometimes even
powerful, insights that enhance understanding, foster self-knowledge,
liberate the imagination, and satisfy or induce desire? Indeed.5 8 Do we
have to believe in them to conclude they have some validity as forms of
knowledge? Of course not. The relationship between knowledge, understanding, and belief is much more complex and often much less direct
than Schlag's invocation of reason would admit.5 9
The point is that Schlag's notion of reason is an exact reflection of
that deployed by those he seeks to criticize; it mirrors the epistemological framework of the mainstream legal academy in allowing the elision
of knowledge and belief to stand. Hence, for example, Susanna Sherry's
60
shock at the use by legal scholars of stories that may not even be true!
Hence, too, her misplaced comparison of feminist legal scholarship/critical race theory with the beliefs of religious fundamentalists. 6' Sherry
presupposes (rather than proves) that religious believers and radical
legal scholars are making similar kinds of knowledge claims and therefore stand or fall on the same test of validity (neither can properly
ground belief). Schlag's strategy is to show that whatever test of validity
she is invoking, reason fails it too: "once reason is demoted to the status
58. See generally Marina Warner's exploration of fairy tales in,
BLONDE: ON FAIRY TALES AND THEIR TELLERS

FROM THE BEAST TO THE

(1995).

59. Schlag's account of reason, for example, completely neglects the role of the unconscious
in the formation of belief, once again evidencing the "looking glass" effect. In fact, psychoanalytic
theory offers a powerful countemarrative to the Cartesian meta-narrative of the individual rational
subject. See, e.g., Rosi BRAIDOTrI, PATTERNS OF DISSONANCE (Elizabeth Guild trans., 1991).
60. See Sherry, supra note 28, at 463.
61. Id. at 454.
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of belief... it loses its claim to rule." 62 Proceeding as if reason can do
what Sherry and others in the American legal academy
attribute to it, he
63
goes on to show-categorically-that it cannot.
What, though, are the consequences of this mirroring strategy
adopted by Schlag? Do the gains of immanent critique outweigh the
losses that flow from remaining within the frame he is seeking to dissolve? This is probably impossible to assess and Schlag does not make it
easy for himself because he never really spells out the gains beyond the
satisfaction of demonstrating that Susanna Sherry's defence of reason
undoubtedly qualifies as a classic instance of "faith, prejudice, dogma,
and company" in legal scholarship. In fact, the political gains are potentially great as I will endeavor to show later in this article, but there are
costs too, and I am not sure that Schlag is as conscious of these as he
should be.
In occupying the terrain of the opposition, there is always a risk of
conceding too much and probing too little. In Schlag's case, the concern
is that too many aspects of the discursive framework within which he
locates himself survive intact because of his lack of awareness of their
operative significance. For example, the anti-faith stance of the champions of reason finds it way unbidden but not wholly unwelcome into
Schlag's critique. Likewise, magic is presented as ridiculous, fantasy
disparaged for its own sake, and states of enchantment presumed to be
malign.64 Thus, Schlag inadvertently reproduces rationalist norms of
knowledge validation at the same time as he disputes them. Similarly, in
drawing the boundaries of American legal scholarship in the narrowest
of terms to correspond precisely with the work of the academy's mainstream, not only does Schlag exclude "non-traditional" legal scholarship
from the ambit of his consideration, but, by doing so, risks affirming that
exclusion from the definitions of "proper" scholarship posited by those
whose work he derides. Such an effect is exacerbated by his inclusion of
and enthusiastic identification with a recognizable canon of radical
white male theorists comprising Fish, Kennedy, Derrida, and Habermas
(the usual suspects). While Schlag clearly considers these writers to
have insights that cast light on the activities of the mundane and misguided legal mainstream (comprising Dworkin, Sunstein, Nussbaum,
62. ER, supra note 1,at 59.
63. The Enchantment of Reason is thus a classic example of immanent critique in legal

scholarship, adopting the claims and objectives of the mainstream legal academy as the standards
by which it is shown to have failed. For specific discussion of Sherry's work, see id. at 54-55,
131-35. See also Jerome McCristal Culp, Jr., To the Bone: Race and White Privilege, 83 MINN. L.
REV. 1637, 1665-73 (1999).
64. On the positive aspects of fantasy, see further Deborah Maranville, Building a Better Sand
Castle: Fantasy, Growth, and the Enchantment of Reason, 57 U. MIAMI L. REv. 1007 (2003).
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Rawls, Sherry, Radin, and sometimes Hart and Raz as honorary American legal scholars), the unspoken assumption is that no similar enlightenment is found in the work of feminists and critical race scholars.
Schlag may protest that such a conclusion should not properly be drawn,
but by that he simply means he did not consciously intend it, that it is a
mere by-product of the discursive constraints within which he locates
himself. I will not argue with this.
A final concern emerging from the confines of Schlag's selective
mimicry of the mainstream lies in its resolutely legal character. American legal scholars do not, by and large, like to stray too far beyond the
boundaries of what is acceptably "legal"65 and interestingly, neither does
Schlag. He/they prefer the snug confines of traditional legal discourse
and its discontents, modestly professing ignorance and lack of expertise
beyond the terrain of law, narrowly understood as judicial decisions and
the doctrines and theories legal scholars derive from them. Schlag
bemoans this narrowness repeatedly but seems in no great hurry to
escape it. Indeed, one sometimes wonders whether or not his insistence
on so limited an enquiry masks a fear of his moving beyond what he has
experienced as safe and steady ground. By his own admission, this is the
critique of "an insider,"66 but does it simultaneously affirm the attractions of remaining "inside"? This dogged determination to steer clear of
the complexities that an extra-legal dimension might introduce is also
manifest in Schlag's exclusive preoccupation with reason's aesthetic
appeal. While I applaud his efforts to draw attention to the coercive
power of particular aesthetic forms-in the context of law, the compelling effects of grid-like manifestations of reason-his neglect of, indeed
total silence in relation to, other features of law's coerciveness puts him
at risk of overstating his case. This is particularly so when what is
neglected is so closely bound up with what he addresses at such length.
Here, I am thinking in particular of the ideological context within which
law operates and upon which reason seeks to make her mark. In my
view, there is an ideological dimension to the effective deployment of
reason that is not, or is only secondarily, dependent upon its aesthetic
form. There is a detectable distinction (not always but sometimes)
between invocations of reason that are dependent upon the political and
ideological landscape for their validity and deployments of reason that
65. This includes a particular notion of the "political" which is incorporated and deployed in

legal work and which Schlag, in his unguarded moments, tends unselfconsciously to reflect. For
further elaboration of this legally acceptable version of the political, see Schlag, U.S. CLS, supra
note 11, at 207.
66. Schlag's own description of himself, responding to an oral presentation of this paper at
the Symposium, Beyond Right and Reason: PierreSchlag, the Critique of Normativity, and the
Enchantment of Reason, held at the University of Miami School of Law Feb. 22-24, 2002.
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draw upon (or seek to develop) our aesthetic inclinations, particularly
our attraction to order and coherence.67 Often, what seems reasonable is
inextricably related to our understanding of what is possible, and yet, it
is not always the case that what is possible is determined by the boundaries of reason. The ideological landscape abounds with all of the
"sources of belief' making an appearance in Schlag's critique.
The point is that reason as a particular aesthetic does not always
work to disqualify reason as a repository for widely held ideological
beliefs. Although the former may contribute to understandings of the
latter, it may not wholly determine (or be determined by) them. A failure
to acknowledge this explicitly arguably serves to weaken the power of
Schlag's critique. There are times when he invokes a primarily ideological concept of reason-one that relies on notions of truth, self-evidence,
and righteousness-and then proceeds to critique it for its failure to
adhere to an aesthetic form. Sometimes, this is effective, and it is almost
always amusing. 68 At other times, one has a sense that the boot does not
fit, that he is over-emphasizing the importance of the schematic structure
of the argument in circumstances where its success has little to do with
its schematic structure and everything to do with its correspondence to
the ideological status quo. Put bluntly, if reason's appeal to self-evidence (Sunstein) or virtue (Nussbaum) is dependent upon factors beyond
its internal logic, it is not thereby significantly diminished by demonstrating that that logic has reached its limits.
Schlag's account of the wonderland of American legal scholarship
is undoubtedly perceptive; his dissection of the stances adopted by those
who typify it both masterly and liberating, and his representation of his
own alienation intensely resonant of the experiences of many who
occupy the margins of the legal academy. Indeed, therein lies its appeal.
But by the same token, it is at times injudicious in its forays into "hostile" terrain. It fails adequately to guard against the dangers of importation, co-option, domestication, and reproduction. It constitutes even as it
deconstructs. In Schlagean terms, the power of his critique is diminished
by neglect of aspects of the "rhetorical economy" with which he is
engaging. 69 In simpler terms, there appear to be dimensions to his
enchantment of which he is unaware.
67. The truly reasonable position is of course one that combines both notions of reason, as,
for example, Ronald Dworkin's elaboration of the role of the judge in Law's Empire, where
aesthetic appeals to integrity, coherence, and wholeness nestle cosily with a highly ideological
presentation of law's purpose, content, and operation. RONALD DWORKIN, LAW'S EMPIRE (1986).
68. See, e.g., ER, supra note 1, at 40-59 (discussing the work of Cass Sunstein and Martha
Nussbaum).
69. See Schlag, Le Hors, supra note 10, at 1650.
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PERIPHERAL VISIONS

Where does this leave the legal self? For the legal self who is
most rational and most aware of her legal environment, all this
should leave her rather confused. It ought to leave [her] with the
sense that she doesn't know whether she is coming or going-70
whether she is doing things to law or instead hearing legal voices.
Alice tried another question: "What sort of people live here?"
"In that direction," the Cat said . . . "lives a Hatter: and in that
direction ... lives a March Hare. Visit either you like; they're both
mad." "But I don't want to go among mad people," Alice remarked.
"Oh, you can't help that," said the Cat: "we're all mad here. I'm
mad. You're mad." "How do you know I'm mad?" said Alice. "You
must be" said the Cat, "or you wouldn't have come here. "71

If Schlag is to be believed, American legal scholars hover perennially on the brink of insanity, their bifurcated selves held together by the
tenuous thread of their enchantment. 72 There is some evidence for this.
Peter Goodrich, for example, has collected a range of interesting statistics on the mental health of lawyers, in and out of the academy, confirming they are more likely to suffer from mental health-related problems
than the general population." Nevertheless, it would be wrong to conclude that the psychological harm that lawyers apparently sustain stems
directly from their enchantment with reason or, indeed, that all are similarly enchanted. Interestingly, this question of susceptibility is not one
upon which Schlag dwells; his account of the widespread cognitive
impairment of lawyers says little about who is likely to succumb to it. Is
it his claim that anyone exposed to legal training is vulnerable? If so,
how does he know? More particularly, if some are more or less susceptible than others-if feminists and critical race scholars, for example, are
less under reason's spell than those who comprise the academy's mainstream-is this not a matter for comment at least? This brings us round
again to questions of standpoint. Schlag's account of the wonderland of
American law reflects the standpoint of the radical "insider." This is the
view of someone who sees the system from within, a resident, a citizen.
This is not someone who has stumbled down a rabbit hole. But what of
those who do not readily identify with this "insider" status? What of
those for whom legal education was an experience of prolonged cognitive dissonance; whose identity and status within the legal academy is
70. ER, supra note I, at 139.
71. A W, supra note 2, at 65.
72. See, e.g., ER, supra note I, at 126-40.
73. Peter Goodrich, law Induced Anxiety: Legists, Anti-lawyers, and the Boredom of
Legality, 9 Soc. & LEGAL STUD. 143, 143-45 (2000).

2003]

SCHLAG IN WONDERLAND

routinely questioned; whose scholarship is frequently deprecated; whose
voices are barely heard above the cacophony of sound that the citizens
of legal wonderland produce. Where, in other words, is Alice and what

can we learn from her?
Interestingly, Alice, for all her fascination with Wonderland, was
often alienated by it. She suffered problems of identity throughout
(mainly due to frequent and unexpected changes in her size),74 was forever losing her way,75 and exhibited serious signs of cognitive confusion
in her novel poetry recitations.76 At the same time, and despite occa-

sional expressions of longing for escape, there remained a part of her
that was irrepressibly drawn to the strange world upon which she had

come.77 Lurching between fear and fascination, indignation and awe,
sense and nonsense, Alice's experience is that of an outsider.7 8
I want to use the image of Alice as a lens through which to revisit
the legal wonderland that Schlag describes. I want to glimpse the world
where reason dominates thought not from his perspective, 7 9 but from
hers. In other words, I want to deploy the standpoint of an "outsider/

within" to flush out and disrupt those aspects of reason's operation that
Schlag's account does not reach. The "outsider/within" for these purposes is someone who, while sympathetic to the general tenor of

Schlag's critique, nevertheless experiences herself as "other," both to the
world Schlag depicts and to the genderless, raceless content of his critical stance; someone who sees in Schlag's account her own invisibility.
74. "'Who are you?' said the caterpillar.... Alice replied rather shyly, 'I - I hardly know,
Sir, just at present-at least I know who I was when I got up this morning, but I think I must have
been changed several times since then."' See AW, supra note 2, at 50.
75. See, e.g., supra notes 26, 71.
76. "'That is not said right,' said the caterpillar. 'Not quite right, I'm afraid' said Alice,
timidly: 'some of the words have got altered.' 'It is wrong from beginning to end' said the
caterpillar decidedly .... " AW, supra note 2, at 56.
77. "'It was much pleasanter at home,' thought poor Alice. '...
I almost wish I hadn't gone
down that rabbit hole-and yet ... .' Id. at 44.
78. I guess I am Alice. In terms of the world Schlag depicts, I undoubtedly qualify as an
outsider. First, I am not American. Second, I am a woman in what continues to be materially,
socially, and politically, a male-dominated environment. See generally Nancy Levit, Keeping
Feminism in its Place: Sex Segregation and the Domestication of Female Academics, 49 U. KAN.
L. REV. 775 (2001); Celia Wells, Working Out Women in Law Schools, 21 LEGAL STUD. 116
(2001). Third, I am a feminist and as such have long since left any illusions I had about reason
behind me. With reference to American feminist and critical race scholars, it might be more

accurate to use the term "outsider-within," coined by

PATRICIA HILL COLLINS, BLACK FEMINIST

11-12 (2d ed. 2000), to denote
someone who is part of a community but occupies its margins. I will settle for "outsider/within" to
cover all bases.
79. 1 continue to ponder whether Schlag is the White Rabbit, the Mad Hatter, or the March
Hare, but tend currently to see him as the caterpillar.
THOUGHT:

KNOWLEDGE, CONSCIOUSNESS,

AND EMPOWERMENT
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Before proceeding, however, I want to say a few words about what

I do and do not mean by standpoint, with a view toward dispelling any
misconceptions that might otherwise arise.8" First, the idea of standpoint
presupposes the impossibility of non-situated knowledge. Knowledge
derives from and is constituted by social practices (including language),

institutions, and engagements, 81 and knowledge acquisition is inevitably
a process of interaction between the knower and the context in which
she knows. Thus, what is known is always, in some sense, situated or
located. The concept of standpoint seeks to get at the specificity or particularity of the context in which knowledge is formed/produced.
Second, it does not follow from this insight that all perspectives are
indistinguishable in terms of their authority or usefulness or that we cannot agree upon measures by which different kinds of knowledge may be

evaluated.82 While recognition of the social nature of knowledge does
entail a fundamental reassessment of "foundational" approaches to
knowledge formation and validation, in particular, concepts of truth (in
the sense of a single authentic perspective) or objectivity (understood as
"the view from nowhere"), this does not preclude the development and
application of epistemological approaches to knowledge that are not

dependent upon notions of universalism or a belief in self-legitimating
states. Standpoint epistemology is one route towards a post-foundationalist understanding of knowledge, focusing upon its relationship to context, subject-identity, and power.

80. It is hoped in particular to show that, properly deployed, standpoint methodology does not
obliterate" perspectivalism, relativism, and contextualism. See ER, supra note 1, at 84. Rather, it
yields a far more complex understanding of these concepts and their role in knowledge formation
and selection. For a helpful overview of feminist standpoint epistemology, elaborating on some of
the

issues

raised

below,

see

ALESSANDRA

TANESINI,

AN

INTRODUCTION

TO

FEMINIST

EPISTEMOLOGY 138-57 (1999). See also Sylvia Walby, Against Epistemological Chasms: The
Science Question in Feminism Revisited, 26 SIGNS: J. WOMEN INCULTURE & Soc'y 485 (2001);
and Sandra Harding, Can Democratic Values and Interests Ever Play a Rationally Justifiable Role
in the Evaluation of Scientific Work?, 26 Signs: J. WOMEN INCULTURE & Soc'Y 511 (2001), for a
recent debate on the virtues of standpoint epistemology.
81. Even "theoretical" knowledge, as the product of particular social and institutional
conventions about what constitutes theory, is necessarily located in and constituted by those
conventions. Likewise, The Enchantment of Reason offers a powerfully resonant account of the
knowledge-producing practices of the mainstream legal academy.
82. This is one of many erroneous assumptions driving Sherry's critique of "epistemological
pluralism" and is implicit in her highly manipulative conclusion that the rejection of
Enlightenment ideals leads to the legitimation of Holocaust denial. Sherry, supra note 28, at 484.
The development of post-Enlightenment approaches to knowledge evaluation has been a particular
concern among feminist philosophers, producing, inter alia, new formulations of objectivity and
scientific knowledge. See generally SANDRA HARDING, WHOSE SCIENCE? WHOSE KNOWLEDGE?

(1991);

HELEN LONGINO,

SCIENCE AND

SOCIAL KNOWLEDGE:

VALUES

AND

OBJECTIVITY IN

SCIENTIFIC ENQUIRY (1990); see also Walby, supra note 80; Harding, supra note 80.
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Third, standpoint is not necessarily synonymous with "experience." 83 Some versions of standpoint methodology rely more upon
notions of experience than others and there is no doubt that individual
and group experience often constitute the raw material upon which particular standpoints, including feminist standpoints, are articulated. Yet,
in its more sophisticated forms, standpoint is mediated experience, the
product of thinking about and reflecting on experience, or, drawing upon
the work of leading standpoint theorist Sandra Harding, standpoint is the
means by which knowledge is derived from (in the case of feminist
research) "women's lives."84 Standpoint methodology is not, therefore,
inconsistent with a recognition that particular experiences may be fallible and contestable. Nor does it have to proceed on the assumption that
the experiences of a particular group (women, people of color) are necessarily the same. Indeed, properly deployed, standpoint methodology
will highlight, not obscure, difference.85
Finally, to invoke the notion of standpoint is not necessarily to
invoke the idea of an epistemically privileged position. It is true that
early feminist standpoint theories did presume the idea of a particular
female vantage point, derived from the structure of women's lives, that
was privileged because it was the perspective of the oppressed.86 The
claim was that women, by virtue of their marginalized status, could "see
beneath the surface of ...social relations" and thus had a better grasp of

social reality than men who, as rulers, were possessed of a vision that
was both "partial and perverse." 87 The implications of this position, that
there was some "true" reality there to be represented or understood, led
to its rejection by many feminist postmodemists, but the value of standpoint does not have to rest upon such absolute notions of privileging.
This does not mean, however, that there is not a lot to be gained from
83. Nor is reducible to the idea of "perspective." As Sandra Harding observes: "Standpoint is
not a perspective. It takes science and politics to achieve a standpoint. Standpoints are socially
mediated; perspectives are unmediated." Sandra Harding, Reinventing Ourselves as Other: More
Agents of History and of Knowledge, in AMERICAN FEMINIST THOUGHT AT THE CENTURY'S END:

A READER (Linda S. Kauffman ed., 1993).
84. This notion of standpoint fully allows for the possibility of a researcher accessing and
mediating perspectives and experiences that are not her own.
85. This argument is developed further in a feminist legal context in Joanne Conaghan,
Reassessing the Feminist Theoretical Project in Law, 27 J.L. Soc'Y 351 (2000).
86. See, e.g., Nancy Hartsock, The Feminist Standpoint: Developing the Ground for a
Specifically Feminist Historical Materialism, in DISCOVERING REALITY: FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES
METAPHYSICS, METHODOLOGY, AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE 203 (Sandra
Harding & Merrill B. Hintikka eds., 1983).
87. Id. at 285-87. See also the pioneering work of Patricia Hill Collins, supra note 78,
developing standpoint methodology in a black feminist context. Collins argues that the position of
"outsider-within" a community "provides a distinctive angle of vision," id. at 12, which, while
partial, necessarily contributes to a better understanding of social relations. For elaboration, see id.
at 251-71.
ON EPISTEMOLOGY,
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focusing on the lives of marginalized or oppressed people. Once we
accept the social nature of knowledge, we must also recognize that it is
"not politically innocent," 88 in particular that it is intimately connected
to power, its exercise, and its effects. The context in which knowledge is
produced and disseminated includes social relations that are oppressive
and hierarchical, leading to the systematic silencing or devaluation of
some perspectives and the privileging of others. Thus, if we want to
expand our understanding, build our knowledge of the world we inhabit,
we must endeavor to counter the effects of dominance by seeking out
those perspectives not readily available. Sometimes, that may require us
to assume a sceptical attitude towards presentations of social relations
(whether in the legal academy or otherwise) in which the perspectives of
the marginalized and oppressed are conspicuous by their absence.
I Am Half Sick of Shadows ....

"

There are, undoubtedly, a number of parallels between Schlag's
dissection of reason's operation in law and the critical insights that have
emerged from feminist legal scholarship. In both cases, the concern with
reason is in terms of its role in constituting and legitimating legal knowledge, and the reductions and distortions to perception and the understanding this produces. Indeed, the role of reason in the constitution of
an univocal legal knowledge that operates to disqualify other forms of
knowledge is a recurrent theme of legal feminist work.9 0 While Schlag is
concerned with the general damage that reason inflicts upon "one's cognitive possibilities,"'" the primary concern of feminist legal scholars is
with the power implications of reason's legal deployment. Feminists
come to reason as a legitimating discourse deeply implicated in
women's disadvantage.
At the same time, neither Schlag nor feminists are wholly immune
to reason's charms. Schlag's distaste for deception reveals a desire for
integrity that is resonant of the best of reason's promises. Feminist
emphasis on the development of strategies to combat, inter alia, gender
disadvantage presupposes a capacity for critical thought and action that
might be thought to correspond with something akin to reason. Indeed,
88.
89.

TANESINI, supra note 80, at 187.
TENNYSON, supra note 30, at 54.

90. See, in particular,

MARGARET THORNTON, DISSONANCE AND DISTRUST: WOMEN IN THE

LEGAL PROFESSION 73-79 (1996); Joanne Conaghan, Tort Law and the Feminist Critique of

Reason, in FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON THE FOUNDATIONAL SUBJECTS OF LAW (Anne Bottomley
ed., 1996). See also NICOLA LACEY, UNSPEAKABLE SUBJECTS: FEMINIST ESSAYS IN LEGAL AND
SOCIAL THEORY 2-14 (1998), for an excellent general overview of feminist critiques of
conventional legal scholarship, including invocations of legal rationality.
91. ER, supra note 1, at 144.
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many argue passionately that despite its checkered path, reason is the

most effective route to women's emancipation.92 Thus, in both instances
the relationship with reason is fraught with complexity and ambivalence.
Neither Schlag nor feminists are wholly willing to abandon it.
But there the commonalities cease, the parallels fade away, the

landscape radically changes. Applying a gender lens to Schlag's account
of reason's operation, the prospect now before us is one in which

notions of gender and reason appear inseparable; in which material context-raw, messy, often ugly to behold-figures prominently in reason's
critique; in which bodies-in all their rich diversity and variegationcome into view.
Consider first the often-rehearsed claim that reason is "male" or
"gendered." This dimension-completely absent from Schlag's critique-is the primary route by which most feminists come to debate
about reason. What exactly does the claim that reason is male or
gendered entail and what, if any, are the consequences of failing to

address it? One can find an abundance of evidence, both in philosophical
and legal writing, of the view that Women, by virtue of their biological

differences from men, have inferior reasoning capacities. This is
explicit, for example, in the work of Aristotle9 3 and Rousseau, 94 and
implicit in the writings of Locke 95 and Kant. 96 It is also to be found in
legal judgements, particularly those of the late nineteenth century deny-

ing women access to the professions. Thus, a Scottish judge considering
women's eligibility to study medicine observed: "It is a belief, widely

entertained, that there is a great difference in the mental constitution of
the two sexes, just as there is in their physical conformation.

97

92. See, e.g., Martha Nussbaum, Feminists and Philosophy, N.Y. REV. BOOKS, Oct. 20, 1994,
at 59-63; Sabina Lovibond, Feminism and Post Modernism, 178 N. LEFr REV. 5 (1989).
93. For Aristotle's views on women, see SUSAN MOLLER OKIN, WOMEN IN WESTERN
POLITICAL THOUGHT 73-96 (1979); JEAN GRIMSHAW, PHILOSOPHY AND FEMINIST THINKING 38-42
(1986); Marcia L. Homiak, Feminism and Aristototle's Rational Ideal, in A MIND OF ONE'S OWN:
FEMINIST ESSAYS ON REASON AND OBJECTIVITY I (Louise M. Anthony & Charlotte Witt eds.,
1993) (arguing a defense of Aristotelian rationality in feminist terms).
94. See OKIN, supra note 93, at 99-194 (providing an extensive discussion of Rousseau's
views on women).
95. SANDRA FREDMAN, WOMEN AND THE LAW 7-9 (1997); GRIMSHAW, supra note 93, at 5052.
96. See GRIMSHAW, supra note 93, at 42-46 (analyzing Kant's Of the Distinction between the
Beautiful and the Sublime in the Interrelations of the Two Sexes).
97. Jex-Blake v. Senatus of Edinburgh Univ., I I M 784 (1873) (per Lord Neaves),
reproduced in J.O. BRIDGEMAN & SUSAN MILLNS, FEMINIST PERSPECTIVES ON LAW: LAW'S
ENGAGEMENT WITH THE FEMALE BODY 12, 14 (1998). See also Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130
(1873) (Barker, J., concurring) ("The natural and proper timidity and delicacy which belongs to
the female sex evidently unfits [her] for many of the occupations of civil life.").
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The assumption was that because women's bodies differed from
men's, so also did their minds: women's outward appearance and, in
particular, their reproductive capacities became grounds for asserting
their intellectual inferiority. In this sense, reason was perceived as naturally or biologically male.
Even early feminists such as Mary Wollstonecraft, who challenged
the denial of full reasoning capacity to women, continued to acknowledge intellectual differences between the sexes claiming that they were
social rather than biological in origin, a product of their confined lives
and consequently narrow aspirations.98 Similarly, John Stuart Mill
argued that women's apparent unfitness for many aspects of public life
was a consequence of differences "in their education and circumstances"
rather than "nature." 9 9 In both cases, the assertion was effectively that
nurture, not nature, was to blame for women's intellectual inadequacies
although, as always, the line here is far from clear-cut. Insofar as
women's social roles were prescribed and proscribed by their biological
functions, women's bodies continued to be viewed as, to a degree,
incompatible with the development of full reasoning skills. Reason
might only be socially male, but society can be just as oppressive as
biology.
In recent times, the social argument has taken a more positive turn,
with feminists focusing not on what women lack in terms of traditional
reasoning skills but rather on what they have in terms of distinctly feminine ways of knowing.1"' The social knowledge derived from women's
lives highlights reason's particularity and its limits. It also points to a
realm that reason cannot reach and in which it does not reign. As de
Beauvoir remarked:
Women have no grasp on the world of men because their experience
does not teach them to use logic and technique: inversely, masculine
apparatus loses its powers at the frontiers of the feminine realm.
There is a whole region of human experience which the male deliberately ignores because he fails to think it; this experience woman
98.
A

MARY WOLLSTONECRAFT,

A Vindication of the Rights of Women, in

WOLLSTONECRAFT:

VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF MAN AND A VINDICATION OF THE RIGHTS OF WOMAN AND

In addressing the education of women,
Wollstonecraft observes: "I shall only insist that men have increased that inferiority till women are
HINTS 87-125 (Sylvana Tomaselli ed., 1995) (1792).

almost sunk below the standard of rational creatures. Let their faculties have room to unfold, and

their virtues to gain strength and then determine where the whole sex must stand in the intellectual
scale." Id. at 105.
99. John Stuart Mill, The Subjection of Women, in ESSAYS ON SEX EQUALITY 185 (Alice
Rossi ed., 1970) (1869).
100. See generally CAROL GILLIGAN, IN A DIFFERENT VOICE: PSYCHOLOGICAL THEORY AND
WOMEN'S DEVELOPMENT

(1982).
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lives. 0I
This modem version of the social masculinization of reason is a potentially powerful weapon in the armory of the critic of reason. It renders
reason both contingent and particular; it draws attention to the hidden
values upon which reason's purported neutrality rests; 10 2 and it necessarily exposes the hierarchies reason institutes, simultaneously undermining them. Where it founders, of course, is in the essentializing
assumptions about gender that tend to underpin it. Social life is too
diverse and gender identity too unstable to sustain the claim that women
and men, by virtue of distinct social roles, reason differently.
One route round this difficulty is simply to take gender out of the
equation; that is, to reassert the insights that (inter alia) the feminist
critique of reason has elicited-in terms of reason's particularity, imperious tendencies, and hierarchical effects-but to allow the gender
dimension to disappear. This is, up to a point, precisely what Schlag has
done.10 3 Because it cannot confidently be asserted that reason is biologically or socially male, gender is deemed irrelevant. The difficulty is that
it is not. There continues to be a strong cultural association between
reason and masculinity that critics of reason ignore at their peril.
The long history of reason's association with masculinity in western philosophical thought has been painstakingly tracked and analyzed
by feminist scholars." ° The story that unfolds is far from unidimensional or one-track; the implication of gender in discourses of reason is
both complex and multifaceted. At the same time, certain features of
their imbrication merge. In particular, it is clear that maleness often
operates as a metaphor for reason and reason as a metaphor for male101. SIMONE DE BEAUVOIR, THE SECOND SEX

622 (H.M. Parshley trans., 1989).

102. For example, the prioritizing of rights over relationships or justice over care. See
GILLIGAN, supra note 100; see also ROBIN WEST, CARING FOR JUSTICE (1997). For a parallel

critique of the specificity of reason as instrumental, see JURGEN HABERMAS, KNOWLEDGE AND
HUMAN INTERESTS (Jeremy J. Shapiro trans., 1971). This (un)ethical/ideological dimension to

reason-its importation and legitimation of a particular set of values about human nature and
social organization-is evident nowhere in Schlag's critique.

103. Schlag has stopped short of an important dimension of the feminist critique in pushing the
boundaries of reason in a positive direction to embrace a wider range of cognitive processes.
Schlag's concern is to expose what rational discourse, traditionally conceived, expresses;
feminists are concerned with uncovering and articulating what it suppresses. This is not to say that
he is without his moments of recognition. For example, his observation that: "Faith in reason is

not without its opportunity costs-namely, the costs involved in sacrificing the other sources of
belief, sources such as experience, custom, convention, intuition, disclosure, perception,

awareness, understanding, and so on." ER, supra note 1, at 58.
104. See, e.g.,

GENEVIEVE LLOYD, THE MAN OF REASON: "MALE" AND "FEMALE" IN WESTERN

PHILOSOPHY (1984); SUSAN BORDO, THE FLIGHT TO OBJECTIVITY: ESSAYS ON CARTESIANISM AND

CULTURE (1987); BRAIDOTTI, supra note 59. For useful overviews of the feminist critique of
reason, see TANESINI, supra note 80, at 212-36; see also Linda Alcoff, Is the Feminist Critique of
Reason Rational?, 26 PHIL. EXCHANGE 59-79 (1995).
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ness. In a sexually hierarchical world, masculinity lends authority to reason, and reason gives weight to masculinity and the social relations upon
which it is based. It follows too that femininity is often presented as
symbolic of what reason is not; woman is invoked to denote that which
reason stands against; she is nature not culture, private not public, body
not mind, emotion not reason, open not closed." 5 She represents the
other side of Cartesian reason, a narrow conception of reason that privileges abstract, passionless, disembodied thinking over human thought in
general. 0 6 This is reason, more or less, as it appears in Schlag's critique.
If masculinity lends authority to the kind of reason Schlag is addressing;
if femininity is symbolically excluded from it; if, in other words, reason
functions as a norm in the constitution, regulation, and validation of
gendered social relations, what are the implications of failing to
acknowledge this? To put it another way, what does a gender perspective reveal that a Schlagean standpoint overlooks?
The Mirror Cracked ....107
In a multitude of ways, this blindness to the gendered implications
of reason reveals the limits of Schlag's critical interrogation. It fixes the
point where he stops asking questions, the moment when his analysis is
"marked by [his] own authorship."'0 8 It betrays both his standpoint and
his lack of awareness of it. Most importantly, it exposes the consequences of this inattention.
First, take Schlag's apparent disregard for the dualisms typically
invoked to denote and delimit reason's domain. In particular, neither the
mind/body nor the reason/emotion dichotomies emerge as significant in
Schlag's account of reason's role in legal scholarship. Emotion, for
example, is listed by Schlag as just one of many sources of belief above
which reason purports to stand. The rhetorical power and frequent invocation of reason over emotion in legal discourse does not fully emerge
although it is actively played out in Sherry's article. 0 9 More importantly, it is not clear that Schlag's critique seriously undermines the reason/emotion dualism. Although Schlag intends to show that reason is no
105. See, e.g., Jean Paul Sartre, "The obscenity of the female sex is that of everything that
'gapes open."' See GRIMSHAW, supra note 93, at 35. See quote from DE BEAUVOIR, supra text
accompanying note 101 (identifying women with what cannot be defined).
106. On the maleness of Cartesian rationality, see LLOYD, supra note 104; BORDO, supra note
104. Not all feminists agree that Cartesian rationality is irretrievably masculine. See, e.g.,
Margaret Atherton, Cartesian Reason and Gendered Reason, in A MIND OF ONE'S OWN, supra
note 93, at 19.
107. See TENNYSON, supra note 30, at 56.
108. Anne Bottomley, The Many Appearances of the Body in Fenzinist Scholarship, in BODY
LORE AND LAWS: ESSAYS ON LAW AND THE HUMAN BODY 128 (Martin Richards etal. eds., 2002).
109. See Sherry, supra note 28, at 476-77.
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better than (among a host of other things) emotion, thus challenging the
dualism's hierarchy, what he does not do is seriously question representations of cognition that assume the separation of reason and emotion.
By restricting himself, for the most part, to a narrow investigation of
reason as a source of belief (as opposed to a cognitive process), there
lingers undisturbed an assumption that reason can be exercised without
emotion (even if it very often is not).
Similarly and relatedly, Schlag not only fails to attend to the significance of the mind/body dichotomy in discourses of reason, but, as a
consequence, actively reinforces it. Nothing in The Enchantmentof Reason questions the separation of reason from our embodied condition; at
no point is there any acknowledgement of the corporeal context in which
reason is exercised. Bodies are simply not in Schlag's script."10
By contrast, the symbolic association of the body with femininity in
western philosophical and political discourse and its consequent exclusion from the parameters of rational discourse has inevitably drawn feminist attention, so much so that the body has become one of the most
important and recurring themes in feminist scholarship, a powerful lens
through which feminists can glean new understandings of what and how
we know.'' A focus on the body spotlights the extent to which knowledge-producing practices continue to be embedded in the mind/body
dichotomy; that is, in the assumption that corporeal context is irrelevant12
to the exercise of the mind except insofar as it is governed by it."
Within this ubiquitous frame of reference, mind rules matter, logic tames
experience, and reason, devoid of the corrupting influence of materiality,
delivers truth. Moreover, the scholar is deemed immortal, his particularity erased, his standpoint denied. The body is a way of challenging this
immortality and the limitations it imposes on understanding. It also renders standpoint explicit. As Bottomley observes: "A central theme of
feminist work is the need for 'embodiment' . . . which, in this context,

emphasises that we think and write from a position in which we are
never simply 'mind'... we are so much more and therefore so much less
than that."' 13
In The Enchantment of Reason, the body is simply assumed away,

its banishment accompanied by a series of defacto exclusions, including
110. See Pether, supra note 19, at 224.

111. Pioneering feminist work on the body includes

JUDITH BUTLER, BODIES THAT MATTER:

(1993), and ELISABETH GRosz, VOLATILE BODIES: TOWARD A
CORPOREAL FEMINISM (1994). For excellent analysis and overview of feminist perspectives on the
body, in and beyond a legal context, see Therese Murphy, Feminism on Flesh, 8 LAW & CRITIQUE
37 (1997); see also Bottomley, supra note 108.
112. See GROSZ, supra note 11l, at 14.
113. Id. at 128.
ON THE DISCURSIVE LIMITS OF SEX
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gender, race, context, material practices, and history. Their exclusion
operates metaphorically to affirm "the view from nowhere," the idea,
crucial to conventional legal discourse, that reason, properly exercised,
is independent of identity and circumstances; 1 4 that it is, in other words,
unsituated. It looks like the mind/body dichotomy is at the heart of what
is missing from Schlag's critique.
Without the body, gender fails to materialize and its association
with reason is overlooked. In fact, the problem here has a circularity to
it. Because he fails to attend to gender perspectives, Schlag misses the
importance of the mind/body dichotomy in conferring reason's authority. And because he misses the importance of the mind/body dichotomy
in conferring reason's authority, he fails to take account of gender perspectives. In any case, the result is that both the specificity and systematicity of reason's exclusionary tendencies get lost. Schlag
acknowledges that reason effects the "subjugation of the many to the
one, of pluralism to monism, of polytony to monotony, of difference to
sameness,"' 15 but nothing in his account tells us who or what is subjugated. By contrast, a focus on standpoint can illuminate how concepts
such as coherence and fit-legal reason's favored form-help to sustain
the political and ideological status quo by disqualifying the perspectives
of marginalized and oppressed groups. As Margaret Radin remarks, "if
the perspective of the oppressed includes significant portions of the
dominant conception of the world, and the role of the oppressed group in
it, then the oppressed perspective may well be incoherent ..... 16 It also
follows that reason, effectively deployed, can do far more than convert
"tastes and preferences into the idioms of law .

.

."' I"Certainly,

these

are not random conversions. One might be forgiven, however, after
reading The Enchantment of Reason, from assuming that they were. For
similar reasons, race too is rendered invisible, and with it the concerns of
critical race theorists. People of color have long had ample grounds for
regarding the mind/body dichotomy as suspect, its philosophical
endorsement having too long co-existed with material practices with
which it contradicts. Thus, the narratives of critical race theorists are, to
a significant extent, narratives of and about the body." 8 They are a
direct challenge to academic discourses that render the body immaterial.
Race is a lens that spotlights particularity because the general has been
114. See Sherry, supra note 28, at 456.
115. ER, supra note 1, at 44.
116. Margaret Jane Radin, The Pragmatist and the Feminist, 63 S.C. L. REV. 1699, 1711

(1999).
117. ER, supra note 1, at 34.
118. See, e.g., Anthony Paul Farley, The Black Body as a Fetish Object, 76 OR. L. REV. 457
(1997); see also generally THINKING THROUGH THE BODY OF LAW (Pheng Cheah et al. eds., 1996).
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formed in the image of whiteness. Thus, the project of embodiment has
strategic implications for critical race theorists as well as feminists.
More importantly, the mind/body dichotomy implicates reason directly
in racist and sexist beliefs and practices.
The lack of attention to any kind of material context in The
Enchantment of Reason only serves to compound these problems. In an
idealist exploration of reason, gender and race are concepts that are easy
to overlook. Yet, when reason is (re)located alongside the material and
social practices which produce it, gender and race are more likely to
come into view. This is nowhere better illustrated than in the context of
current debate in the American legal academy about the "rationality" of
feminist and critical race scholarship.' 19 It is difficult to come away
from this body of literature without some awareness of the acute relevance of race and gender to the politics and practices of American legal
academia. This wave of "attack scholarship"' 2 ° has all the hallmarks of a
power struggle in which the privileged, compelled to justify their privilege, fiercely defend the idea that "academic standards" act as neutral
arbiters of intellectual value and worth.' 2 ' Reason, unsurprisingly, is up
to its neck in it. At best, it is a mantra for ignorance and smug complacency; at worst, it is a euphemism for intolerance, close-mindedness,
and the preservation of white male supremacy. It is certainly difficult to
disentangle current versions of reason, as articulated by mainstream
American legal scholars, from the politics of racism and sexism in the
academy. 122 Remarkably, Schlag manages it.
CONCLUSION

To be legally trained is to undergo a serious reduction of one's
cognitive possibilities.123
"Well it's no use your talking about waking him," said Tweedledum, "when you're only one of the things in his dream. You know
very well you're not real." "I am real!" said Alice, and began to cry
119. See, e.g., Alexander, supra note 15; SHERRY & FARBER, supra note 16; Sherry, supra note

28.
120. Keith Aoki, The Scholarship of Reconstruction and the Politics of the Backlash, 81 IOWA
L. REV. 1467, 1471 (1996); see also Nancy Levit, Critical of Race Theory: Race, Reason, Merit,
and Civility, 87 GEO. L.J. 795, 815 (1999) (discussing the incivility and intolerance characterizing

many critiques of feminist and critical race theory).
121. For a critical exploration of "the evaluation controversy" see
LAW, supra note 4, at 60-76.
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122. Lest it be thought that United States legal scholars have a monopoly on racism, see Peter
Goodrich & Linda Mills, The Law of White Spaces: Race, Culture, and Legal Education, 51 J.
LEGAL

EDUC. 15 (2001), for an account of sadly familiar practices in the British academy.

123. ER, supra note 1, at 143-44.
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I shouldn't be able to cry. "124

During the course of this article, I have sought to invoke notions of
standpoint to identify and explore the political and intellectual implications of Pierre Schlag's failure to engage with feminist and critical race
scholarship. I have suggested that in the context of the tasks The
Enchantment of Reason sets out to perform, such neglect is serious and
weakens the authority of his critique. Nevertheless, what flaws in his
work there are, in my view, are far from fatal. In addition, it would be
wrong of me to finish this account without acknowledging the power
that remains. Pierre Schlag makes us think long and hard about legal
education, and, in particular, about what it is we do when we teach our
students to "think like lawyers." He delineates the contours and traces
the paths along which legal reasoning purports to progress, identifying
the traps to which the unwitting (Dworkin, Sunstein, Sherry . . .) too
easily succumb. By so doing, he highlights the deleterious effects that
(legal) reason can induce, including severe cognitive limitations ("serious blind spots and a stunningly selective sense of curiosity"' 2 5 ) and the
virtual shutting down of imagination and creativity.
Insofar as Schlag's concern is with developing strategies of resistance to these mind-numbing effects, I am with him all the way. Nor do I
see this as a solely pedagogic issue, although Schlag's work has strong
pedagogic promise. What Schlag does is open up a space for new understandings of what "doing law" can entail. His focus on the delusions that
afflict those who deploy conventional legal methods does more than
affect their discreditation. In his sharp delineation of the intellectual
structure and internal dynamics of traditional legal arguments, Schlag
exorcizes reason and frees the legal self from the prison of her own
alienation; or, at least, he contributes to conditions in which we might
come to believe this to be possible. It is a pity, then, to see that even he
has blind spots. It is disheartening to recognize-just at the very point
where liberation from "small thinking"' 2 6 and "shallow forms of
thought'
seems possible-that he is still, to some extent, imprisoned.
It is impossible not to want to save him from his gloomy pronouncements about the inescapability' 2 8 and dreariness 2 9 of it all. At the same
time, one cannot suppress the lurking suspicion that his all-pervading
scepticism derives from the luxury of occupying a position where he
124.
125.
126.
127.
128.
129.

See ALG, supra note 26, at 155.
ER, supra note 1, at 140 (footnote omitted).
Id. at 144.
Id.
Id. at 17.
Id. at 141-42.
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does not have to believe-passionately and unremittingly-in the possibility that we can shape the world to better ends.
In the end, it comes down to this. Representations are always
approximations and we each simultaneously instigate and operate under
conditions of constraint. These are the important insights. They should
not remain obscured behind blustering invocations of the rational autonomous subject; nor should they be dismissed as trite or inconsequential. 130 In tracking the delusions and excesses of American legal
scholars, Schlag makes these insights harder to ignore. Yet, he remains
unwilling to look closely at what precisely they entail. After all, there is
constraint, and then there is constraint. There are representations, and
there are representations. Standpoint methodology highlights the gap
between the representations of the dominant and the lives and experiences of the oppressed; it helps us distinguish the recognition that discourse generally is accompanied by constraint from the specification of
the particular constraints that characterize the lives of oppressed and
marginalized people. Without standpoint, there is a real risk, as Schlag's
book demonstrates, that these differences simply will not surface.
Effaced from discourse-radical or otherwise-they are simultaneously
effaced from our consciousness.
The Enchantmentof Reason is a powerful book with concrete political implications, but its standpoint (unsurprisingly) reflects the situation
of its author. It is the standpoint of someone who is bemused by the
prodigious invocation of an idea which is either not what it purports to
be or which, pushed to its limits, is without substance. It is not the standpoint of an "outsider/within" the academy. That does not mean it is
without value to feminists, critical race scholars, and others with "outsider" status. On the contrary, in collapsing reason into its "traditional
enemies," Schlag's book constitutes a compelling indictment of the
intellectual status quo in American law, exposing its tendentiousness,
folly, and fragility.
At this the whole pack rose up into the air, and came flying down
upon her; she gave a little scream, half of fright and half of anger,

and tried to beat them off, and found herself lying on the bank, with
her head in the lap of her sister, who was gently brushing away some
dead leaves that had fluttered down from the trees upon her face.
"Wake up, Alice dear," said her sister. "Why what a long sleep
you've had!" "Oh, I've had such a curious dream!" said Alice. 131
130. As in Larry Alexander's incomprehensible remark that "our situatedness is as immaterial
to our theoretical enterprises as it is inevitable." Larry Alexander, Theory's A What Comes
Natcherly, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 777, 778 (2000).
131. See AW, supra note 2, at 109.

